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Abstract—In this paper, we study the secrecy rate
and outage probability in Multiple-Input-Single-Output
(MISO) Gaussian wiretap channels at the limit of a
large number of legitimate users and eavesdroppers. In
particular, we analyze the asymptotic achievable secrecy
rates and outage, when only statistical knowledge on the
wiretap channels is available to the transmitter.
The analysis provides exact expressions for the reduction
in the secrecy rate as the number of eavesdroppers grows,
compared to the boost in the secrecy rate as the number
of legitimate users grows.
I. INTRODUCTION
The explosive expansion of wireless communication
and wireless based services is leading to a growing
necessity to provide privacy in such systems. Due to the
broadcast nature of the transmission, wireless networks
are inherently susceptible to eavesdropping. One of the
most promising techniques to overcome this drawback is
utilizing Physical-Layer security. Physical-layer security
leverages the random nature of communication channels
to enable encoding techniques such that eavesdroppers
with inferior channel quality are unable to extract any
information about the transmitted information from their
received signal [1]–[3].
Many recent studies have explored the potential gains
in exploiting multiple antenna technology for attaining
secrecy in various setups. For example, in the case of
a single eavesdropper, when the transmitter has a full
Channel State Information (CSI) on the wiretap channel,
it can ensure inferior wiretap channel by nulling the
reception on the eavesdropper’s end, thus, achieve higher
secrecy rates [4]–[6]. When the user and eavesdropper
are also equipped with multiple antennas, the optimal
strategy is to utilize linear precoding in order to focus
energy only in few directions, thus achieving the optimal
secrecy rate [7]. In case that only statistical information
on the wiretap channel is available, the optimal scheme
is beamforming in the user’s direction [4], [8]. However,
in this case, a secrecy outage, the event that at the
eavesdropper is able to extract all or part of the message,
is unavoidable. To mitigate risk, one should consider
transmitting Artificial Noise (AN) to further degrade the
wiretap channel [9]–[13].
The secrecy capacity at the limit of large number of
antennas was considered in [9], [10]. Particularly, [9],
[10] studied the asymptotic (in the number of cooper-
ating antennas) secrecy capacity, for a single receiver.
[14] used Extreme Value Theory (EVT) to study the
scaling law of the secrecy sum-rate under a random
beamforming scheme, when the users and eavesdroppers
are paired. That is, each user was susceptible to eaves-
dropping only by its paired (single) eavesdropper. [15]
considered the asymptotic secrecy rate, where both the
number of users and number of antennas grow to infinity,
while all users are potentially malicious and few external
eavesdroppers are wiretapping to the transmissions.
In the presence of a single user and multiple eaves-
droppers, where the transmitter has no CSI on the
wiretap channels, a secrecy outage will definitely occur
as the number of eavesdroppers goes to infinite [16]. On
the other hand, when there are many legitimate users,
and the transmitter can select users opportunistically,
the secrecy outage probability is open in general. In
particular, the asymptotically exact expression to the
number of users required in order to attain sufficiently
small secrecy outage probability, is yet to be solved.
This study analyzes this subtle relation between the
number of users, eavesdroppers and the resulting secrecy
outage probability. Specifically, we consider the secrecy
rate and outage probability for the Gaussian MISO
wiretap channel model, where a transmitter is serving
K legitimate users in the presence of M eavesdroppers,
and analyze the secrecy outage probability as a function
of K and M , and more importantly, the relation between
these two numbers.
We assume that CSI is available from all legitimate
users, yet only channel statistics are available on the
eavesdroppers. As previously mentioned, when the trans-
mitter has only statistical information on the wiretap
channel, transmitting in the direction of the attending
ar
X
iv
:1
60
5.
02
34
9v
1 
 [c
s.I
T]
  8
 M
ay
 20
16
user is optimal when AN is not allowed. Moreover, in
large scale systems, using AN may interfere with other
cells, and probably would not be a method of choice
even at the price of reduced secrecy rate. Beamforming
to the attending user, on the other hand, is the de-
facto transmission scheme in many MISO systems today.
Therefore, we adopt the scheme in which at each trans-
mission opportunity the transmitter beamforms in the
direction of a user with favorable channel. We analyze
the asymptotics of the secrecy rate and secrecy outage
under the aforementioned scheme. In particular, our con-
tributions are as follows: (i) We first analyze the secrecy
rate distribution when transmitting to the strongest user
while many eavesdroppers are wiretapping. These results
are utilized to attain the secrecy outage probability in the
absence of the wiretap channels’ CSI. (ii) We provide
both upper and lower bounds on the limiting secrecy rate
distribution. The bounds are tractable and give insight on
the scaling law and the effect of the system parameters
on the secrecy capacity. We show via simulations that
our bounds are tight. (iii) We quantify the reduction in
the secrecy rate as the number of eavesdroppers grows,
compared to the boost in the secrecy rate as the number
of legitimate users grows. We show that in order to attain
asymptotically small secrecy outage probability with t
transmit antennas, Ω
(
n (log n)
t−1
)
users are required in
order to compensate for n eavesdroppers in the system.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Throughout this paper, we use bold lower case letters
to denote random variables and random vectors, unless
stated otherwise. V † denotes the Hermitian transpose of
matrix V . Further, | · |, 〈·, ·〉 and ‖ · ‖ denote the absolute
value of a scalar, the inner product and the Euclidean
norm of vectors, respectively.
Consider a MISO downlink channel with one trans-
mitter with t transmit antennas, K legitimate users with
a single antenna and M uncooperative eavesdroppers,
again, with one antenna each. The transmitter adopts the
scheme in which at each transmission opportunity the
transmitter beamforms in the direction of the selected
user without AN. We assume a block fading channel
where the transmitter can query for fine channel reports
from the users before each transmission, while having
only statistical knowledge on the wiretap channels.
Let yi and zj denote the received signals at user i
and at eavesdropper j, respectively. Then, the received
signals can be described as yi = hix + nb(i) and zj =
gjx + ne(j), where hi ∈ Ct×1 and gj ∈ Ct×1 are the
channel vectors between the transmitter and user i, and
between the transmitter and eavesdropper j, respectively.
hi and gj are random complex Gaussian channel vectors,
where the entries have zero mean and unit variance in
the real and imaginary parts. x ∈ Ct is the transmitted
vector, with a power constraint E
[
x†x
] ≤ P , while
nb(i),ne(j) ∈ C are unit variance Gaussian noises seen
at user i and eavesdropper j, respectively.
The secrecy capacity for the Gaussian MIMO wiretap
channel, where the main and wiretap channels, H and
G, respectively, are known at the transmitter, was given
in [7], [10]
Cs = max
Σx
log det
(
I +HΣxH
†
)
− log det
(
I +GΣxG
†
)
(1)
with tr (Σx) ≤ P . For the special case of Gaussian
MISO wiretap channel, (1) reduces to
Cs = max
Σx
log det
(
I + hΣxh
†
)
− log det
(
I + gΣxg
†
)
.
In both Gaussian MIMO and MISO, the optimal Σx
is low rank, which means that to achieve the secrecy
capacity, the optimal strategy is transmitting in few
directions. Specifically, for the Gaussian MISO wiretap
channel, the capacity achieving strategy is beamforming
to a single direction, hence, letting w denote a beam
vector, then Σx = ww†, [4]. Moreover, when the wiretap
channel is unknown at the transmitter, it is optimal to
beamform in the direction of the main channel, i.e.,
w = hˆ = h/‖h‖, [4], [8].
Accordingly, when beamforming in the direction of
the user while the eavesdropper is wiretapping, assuming
only the main channel is known to transmitter, the
secrecy capacity is [16], [17]:
Rs(h,g) = log
(
1 + P‖h‖2
1 + P |〈hˆ,g〉|2
)
. (2)
Recall that in the block fading environment, h and g
are random variables and are drawn from the Gaussian
distribution independently after each block (slot). Hence,
the distribution of the ratio in (2) and its support are
critical to obtain important performance metrics. In par-
ticular, the ergodic secrecy rate, i.e., the secrecy rate
when considering coding over a large number of time-
slots, can be obtained by computing an expectation with
respect to the fading of both g and h. Similarly, a certain
target secrecy rate Rs is achievable if the instantaneous
ratio in (2) is greater than the matching value. On the
other hand, a secrecy outage occurs if Rs is greater
than the instantly achievable secrecy rate Rs(h,g), and
thus, the message cannot be delivered securely [17]. The
probability of such event is Pr (Rs(h,g) < Rs).
For clarity, let us point out a few statistical properties
of the ratio in (2). In the denominator, the squared inner
2
product |〈hˆ,g〉|2 follows the Chi-squared distribution
with 2 degrees of freedom, χ2(2) (which is equivalent
to the Exponential distribution with rate parameter 1/2),
since hˆ is normalized, rotating both hˆ and g such that hˆ
aligns with the unit vector does not change the inner
product. Thus, the inner product result in a complex
Gaussian random variable [18], [19]. Similarly, in the
numerator, the squared norm ‖h‖2 follows the Chi-
squared distribution with 2t degrees of freedom, χ2(2t),
since it is a sum of t squared complex Gaussian random
variables. Thus, for any user i and eavesdropper j, the
secrecy SNR when beamforming to user i is equivalent
to the ratio of 1+χ2(2t) and 1+χ2(2) random variables.
A. Main Tool
To assess the ratio in the presence of large num-
ber of users and eavesdroppers, let us recall that for
sufficiently large n, the maximum of a sequence of
n i.i.d. χ2(v) variables, Mn = max (ξ1, ..., ξn) fol-
lows the Gumbel distribution [20, pp. 156]. Specifically,
limn→∞ Pr (Mn ≤ anξ + bn) = exp
{−e−ξ}, where
an and bn are normalizing constants. In this case,
an = 2, (3)
bn = 2
(
log n+
(v
2
− 1
)
log logn− log Γ
[v
2
])
(4)
and Γ[·] is the Gamma function.
In this paper, we study the asymptotic (in the number
of users and eavesdroppers) distribution of the ratio in
(2), and thus derive the secrecy outage probability, when
the transmitter schedules a user with favorable CSI and
beamforms in its direction.
III. ASYMPTOTIC SECRECY OUTAGE
In this section, we analyze the secrecy outage limiting
distribution. That is, for a given target secrecy rate Rs,
we analyze the probability that at least one eavesdropper
among M eavesdroppers will attain information from the
transmission. Obviously, when transmitting to a single
user, and when only statistical knowledge is available
on the wiretap channels, beamforming to the user whose
channel gain is the greatest among K users is optimal.
Accordingly, let i∗ = arg maxi ‖hi‖2 be the index
of the channel with the largest gain, and let j∗ =
arg maxj |〈hˆi∗ ,gj〉|2 be the index of the wiretap channel
whose projection in the direction hˆi∗ is the largest. Note
that when the transmitter beamforms to user i∗ in a
multiple eavesdroppers environment, it should tailor a
code with secrecy rate Rs to protect the message even
from the strongest eavesdropper with respect to i∗, which
is j∗. Of course, with only statistical information on
the eavesdroppers, j∗ is unknown to the transmitter.
Accordingly, the probability of a secrecy outage when
transmitting to user i∗ at secrecy rate Rs is [17]:
Pr
(
log2
(
1 + P‖hi∗‖2
1 + P |〈hˆi∗ ,gj∗〉|2
)
≤ Rs
)
= Pr
(
1 + P‖hi∗‖2
1 + P |〈hˆi∗ ,gj∗〉|2
≤ 2Rs
)
(5)
To ease notation, we denote α = 2Rs .
In the following, we analyze the distribution in (5)
when the number of users and eavesdroppers is large.
In particular, we consider the secrecy rate distribution
when the transmitter beamforms to user i∗, while all
eavesdroppers are striving to intercept the transmission
separately (without cooperation).
When the transmitter is beamforming to a user whose
channel gain is the greatest, then the squared norm
‖hi∗‖2 in the numerator of (5) scales with the number
of users like O(logK) [20]. Nevertheless, the greatest
channel projection in the direction of the attending
user, in the denominator of (5), also scales with the
number of eavesdroppers in the order of O(logM).
Moreover, asymptotically, both the greatest gain and
greatest channel projection follow the Gumbel distri-
bution (with different normalizing constants). Thus, in
order to determine the secrecy rate behavior, as K and M
grow, one needs to address the ratio of Gumbel random
variables. However, the ratio distribution of Gumbel
random variables is not known to have a closed-form
[21]. Thus, we first express it as an infinite sum of
Gamma functions, then provide tight bounds on the
obtained distribution, from which we can infer the outage
probability. Accordingly, we have the following.
Theorem 1. For large enough K and M , the distribution
of the secrecy rate in (5) is the following.
Pr
(
1 + P‖hi∗‖2
1 + P |〈hˆi∗ ,gj∗〉|2
≤ α
)
=
∞∑
k=0
(−1)ke−(k+1)
1+bK−α(1+bM )
αaM
(k + 1)!
Γ
[
1 +
(k + 1)aK
αaM
]
where aK , aM and bK , bM are normalizing constants
given in (3) and (4), respectively.
Note that bK and bM grow at different rate. Specifi-
cally, although bK and bM are both normalizing constant
of the χ2 distribution, bK has value of v = 2t in (4)),
while bM has value of v = 2 in (4). The proof is given
in the Appendix.
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To evaluate the result in Theorem 1, one needs to
evaluate the infinite sum, which is intricate. Thus, the
following upper and lower bounds are useful.
A. Bounds on the Secrecy Rate Distribution
In the following, we suggest an approach that models
EVT according to its tail distribution, which enables
us to provide tight bounds to the distribution in (5).
This approach has very clear and intuitive communica-
tion interpretation. Specifically, for an upper bound, we
put a threshold on eavesdropper j∗’s wiretap channel
projection, and analyze the result under the assumption
that its projection exceeded. For a lower bound, we put
a threshold on user i∗’s channel gain, and analyze the
result under the assumption that its gain has exceeded it.
When only a single user (eavesdropper), among many,
exceeds a threshold on average, then the above-threshold
tail distribution corresponds to the tail of extreme value
distribution [22, Ch. 4.2]. Moreover, the tail limiting
distribution has a mean value that is higher than the
mean value of the extreme value distribution, since the
tail limiting distribution takes into account only events
in which user i∗ (eavesdropper j∗) is sufficiently strong,
namely, above threshold. Thus, replacing the extreme
value distribution of user i∗ (eavesdropper j∗) with its
corresponding tail distribution will increase the numera-
tor (denominator) in (5) on average. Thus, the resulting
secrecy rate is higher (lower), hence, corresponds to a
lower (upper) bound on the ratio CDF.
Let um denote a threshold on the wiretap channel
projection in the direction hˆi∗ , such that a single (the
strongest) eavesdropper exceeds it on average. Note that
such a threshold can be obtained by inversing the com-
plement CDF of the Exponential distribution. Further,
note that this inverse is exactly (4) with v = 2 degrees
of freedom. Accordingly, we have the following lower
bound.
Lemma 1. For sufficiently large K and M , the CDF
of the secrecy rate in (5) satisfies the following upper
bound.
Pr
(
1 + P‖hi∗‖2
1 + P |〈hˆi∗ ,gj∗〉|2
≤ α
)
≤ aK
αaM
e
− 1+bK−α(1+um)αaM Γ
[
aK
αaM
, 0, e
1+bK−α(1+um)
aK
]
,
where Γ [s, 0, z] =
∫ z
0
τse−τdτ is the lower incomplete
Gamma function.
The proof is given in the Appendix. The following
corollary helps gaining insights from Lemma 1.
Corollary 1. For α ≥ 1, the outage probability satisfies
the following bound.
Pr
(
1 + P‖hi∗‖2
1 + P |〈hˆi∗ ,gj∗〉|2
≤ α
)
<
[
Λ(α)
(
1− exp{−Λ(α)−12α−1})]1/α ,
where Λ(α) = (
√
eM)
α Γ(t)√
eK(logK)t−1 .
Note that the value of Λ(α) determines the outage
probability. In particular, at the limit Λ(α) → ∞, the
resulting outage probability is 1 (i.e., when M → ∞
and K is fixed). Similarly, when Λ(α)→ 0, the resulting
outage probability 0. Moreover, we point out that Λ(α) is
decreasing with the number of users as K (logK)t−1,
while increasing with the number of eavesdroppers as
Mα. Thus, roughly speaking, as long as the number of
eavesdroppers M = o
(
K (logK)
t−1
)1/α
, we obtain
Λ(α) = o(1), hence, secrecy outage in the order of o(1).
To prove Corollary 1, the following Claim is useful.
Claim 1 ( [23]–[25]). The incomplete Gamma function
satisfies the following bounds.
(i) Γ [s] (1− e−z)s < Γ [s, 0, z] <
Γ [s]
(
1− e−zΓ[1+s]−1/s
)s
,∀ 0 < s < 1.
This inequality takes the opposite direction for
values of s > 1.
(ii) 2s−1 ≤ Γ [1 + s] ≤ 1,∀ 0 < s < 1.
(iii) Γ [s] Γ [1/s] ≥ 1,∀s > 0.
Proof: (Corollary 1). Applying the normalizing con-
stants in (3)-(4) to Lemma 1 result in
Pr
(
1 + P‖hi∗‖2
1 + P |〈hˆi∗ ,gj∗〉|2
≤ α
)
≤ 1
α
(
(
√
eM)
α
Γ[t]√
eK (logK)
t−1
) 1
α
Γ
[
1
α
, 0,
√
eK (logK)
t−1
(
√
eM)
α
Γ[t]
]
To ease notation, let us denote Λ(α) = (
√
eM)
α
Γ(t)√
eK(logK)t−1 .
Thus, we rewrite Lemma 1 as
Pr
(
1 + P‖hi∗‖2
1 + P |〈hˆi∗ ,gj∗〉|2
≤ α
)
≤ 1
α
Λ(α)1/αΓ
[
1
α
, 0,Λ(α)−1
]
(a)
<
1
α
Λ(α)1/αΓ
[
1
α
](
1− e−
Γ[1+ 1α ]
−α
Λ(α)
)1/α
(b)
≤
[
Λ(α)
(
1− e− 2
α−1
Λ(α)
)]1/α
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Remember that only α ≥ 1 implies secrecy rate greater
than zero. Thus, (a) follows from Claim 1(i), and (b)
follows from Claim 1(ii) and from the Gamma function
recurrence property, Γ
[
1
α
]
= αΓ
[
1 + 1α
]
.
For the lower bound, we utilize a similar approach,
however, this time, we refer to user i∗ as if its channel
gain has exceeded a high threshold. Thus, since only
sufficiently strong user i∗, whose gain is above threshold,
is taken into account, then the numerator in (5) is
larger on average, thus, resulting in a higher rate, which
corresponds to a lower bound on the ratio CDF.
Let uk denote a threshold on the user’s channel
gain, such that a single strongest user exceeds it on
average. Note that such a threshold can be obtained
from the inverse incomplete Gamma function, which
asymptotically, is exactly (4) with v = 2t. Accordingly,
we have the following upper bound.
Lemma 2. For sufficiently large K and M , the CDF
of the secrecy rate in (5) satisfies the following lower
bound.
Pr
(
1 + P‖hi∗‖2
1 + P |〈hˆi∗ ,gj∗〉|2
≤ α
)
≥ 1− αaM
aK
· e−
α(1+bM )−(1+uk)
aK Γ
[
αaM
aK
, 0, e
− 1+uk−α(1+bM )αaM
]
.
The proof is given in the Appendix.
Again, to gain intuition, we have the following.
Corollary 2. For α ≥ 1, the outage probability satisfies
the following bound.
Pr
(
1 + P‖hi∗‖2
1 + P |〈hˆi∗ ,gj∗〉|2
≤ α
)
> 1− Γ [1 + α] Λ(α)−1
(
1− e−Λ(α)1/α
)α
,
where Λ(α) = (
√
eM)
α Γ(t)√
eK(logK)t−1 .
Proof: Similar to Corollary 1, we apply the nor-
malizing constants in (3)-(4) to Lemma 2, then, set
Λ(α) =
(
√
eM)
α
Γ(t)√
eK(logK)t−1 . Thus, we have
Pr
(
1 + P‖hi∗‖2
1 + P |〈hˆi∗ ,gj∗〉|2
≤ α
)
≥ 1− αΛ(α)−1Γ
[
α, 0,Λ(α)1/α
]
(a)
> 1− αΛ(α)−1Γ [α]
(
1− e−Λ(α)1/α
)α
(b)
= 1− Γ [1 + α] Λ(α)−1
(
1− e−Λ(α)1/α
)α
Fig. 1. Simulation and analysis of the ratio distribution in (5) for
M = K = 30 and t = 2, 4, 8 antennas, left to right, respectively.
The solid line represents the sum of the first 100 terms in Theorem 1.
The dashed and dotted lines represent the distribution upper and lower
bounds given in Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, respectively.
where (a) follows form Claim 1(i) and (b) follows from
the Gamma function recurrence property.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we present simulate results for the
suggested scheduling scheme and compare them to the
analysis.
Figure 1 depicts the distribution of the ratio in (5) for
three cases and compare it to the analytical results herein.
In particular, we simulate the secrecy rate in (2) for three
cases: (i) When beamforming to strongest user i∗, while
the strongest, above-threshold, eavesdropper is wiretap-
ping, (ii) when beamforming to strongest user i∗, while
strongest eavesdropper j∗ is wiretapping (without thresh-
old constraint). (iii) when beamforming to strongest,
above-threshold, user, while the strongest eavesdropper
j∗ is wiretapping. The dark gray, gray and light gray bars
represents these results, respectively. Then we evaluate
the bounds given in Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 and compare
then to the sum of the first 100 terms in Theorem 1,
for t = 2, 4, 8 and M = K = 30. It is clear the
bounds are tight and provide excellent approximation
to (5). For comparison between the bounds given in
Corollary 1, Lemma 1, Lemma 2 and Corollary 2, for
t = 4, M = K = 1000, see Figure 2.
Figure 3 depicts the secrecy outage probability. In
particular, we set t = 4 and α = 2, and fix the number
of users to K = 1000. Then we examine what is the
secrecy outage probability as a function of the number
of eavesdroppers. The dots represents the critical ratio
between M and K such that Λ(α) = 1, which is exactly
M = Θ
(
K (logK)
t−1
)1/α
. Indeed, for values of M
which have smaller order than the critical value, result
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Coro. 1
Lemma 1
Lemma 2
Coro. 2
1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0
α0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
P(ratio ≤ α)
Fig. 2. A comparison between the bounds given in Corollary 1,
Lemma 1, Lemma 2 and Corollary 2, respectively, for t = 4, M =
K = 1000.
Coro. 1
Coro. 2
200 400 600 800 1000
M
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
P(Rs ≤ 1 bit )
Fig. 3. The upper and lower bounds given in Corollary 1 and
Corollary 2, for K = 1000, t = 4 and α = 2, as a function of the
number of eavesdroppers M . The marked dot represents the critical
ratio where Λ(α) = 1.
in small values of Λ(α), hence, small outage probability.
V. CONCLUSION
We have studied the secrecy rate and outage probabil-
ity in the presence of multiple legitimate users and eaves-
droppers for the complex Gaussian MISO channel, in
which only statistical knowledge on the wiretap channels
is available to the transmitter. Specifically, we analyzed
the secrecy rate distribution when transmitting to the
strongest user while many eavesdroppers are wiretap-
ping, and derived the resulting secrecy outage probabil-
ity. We showed that the secrecy rate in such transmission
scheme behaves like the ratio of Gumbel distributions,
which does not have a closed form expression. Thus,
tight upper and lower bounds on the limiting secrecy rate
distribution were given. These bounds are tractable and
provide insight on the scaling law and the effect of the
system parameters on the secrecy capacity. In particular,
the reduction in the secrecy rate as the number of eaves-
droppers grows, compared to the boost in the secrecy rate
as the number of legitimate users grows was quantified,
and we proved that in the presence of n eavesdroppers,
to attain asymptotically small secrecy outage probability
with t transmit antennas, Ω
(
n (log n)
t−1
)
legitimate
users are required. To support our claims, we conducted
rigorous simulations that shows that our bounds are tight.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 1
First, note that in (5), the squared norm in the numer-
ator and the squared inner product in the denominator
are independent. Specifically, while the former represents
the length of the user’s channel, the latter represents
the square of the product of the eavesdropper channel’s
magnitude and the cosine of the phase between the
eavesdropper’s channel and the user’s channel. Since
the angle between i.i.d. Gaussian vectors is independent
of their norms [26], the distribution of the squared
inner product in the denominator is identical for all
eavesdroppers and independent of the user index.
Accordingly, to ease notation, let γ i∗ = P‖hi∗‖2
and let γ j∗ = P |〈hˆi∗ ,gj∗〉|2. Note that, asymptot-
ically, as both are maximum of series of random
variables, they have extreme type distributions, e.g.,
γ i∗ ∼ G(PaK , P bK) and γ j∗ ∼ G(PaM , P bM ), where
G(an, bn) denotes the Gumbel distribution with the
normalizing constants an and bn, given in (3) and (4),
respectively. Further, let us define the ratio transform
α = 1+γi∗1+γj∗ and β = γ j∗ , with the inverse transform,
γ i∗ = α(1 + β)− 1. Accordingly, we have,
Pr (α > α,β > β) = Pr (γ i∗ > α(1 + γ j∗)− 1, γ j∗ > β)
=
∫ ∞
β
fγj∗ (γj) (1− Fγi∗ (α(1 + γj)− 1)) dγj
=
(
1− Fγj∗ (β)
)− ∫ ∞
β
fγj∗ (γj)Fγi∗ (α(1 + γj)− 1) dγj
Noting that fγj∗ (γ) =
1
aM
e
− γ−bMaM e−e
− γ−bM
aM and
Fγi∗ (γ) = e
−e−
γ−bK
aK , we exchange variables such that
e
− γ−bMaM = ζ, hence, γ = −aM log(ζ) + bM and dγ =
−aM
ζ dζ. Further, we note that
(
ζ · e−
bM
aM
)αaM
aK
is equal
to e−
αγ
aK , which is useful for this case. Accordingly, we
have,
Pr (α > α,β > β) =
(
1− Fγj∗ (β)
)
−
∫ e− β−bMaM
0
e−ζ exp
{
−e
1+bK−α(1+bM )
aK · ζ
αaM
aK
}
dζ
Generally, this integral cannot be reduced to a closed-
form. However, if we replace e−ζ with its series expan-
sion and noting that we can interchange the sum and the
6
integral from Fubini’s theorem, we have,
Pr (α > α,β > β) =
(
1− Fγj∗ (β)
)− ∞∑
k=0
1
k!
·
∫ e− β−bMaM
0
(−ζ)ke−e
1+bK−α(1+bM )
aK ·ζ
αaM
aK dζ
=
(
1− Fγj∗ (β)
)
− aK
αaM
∞∑
k=0
(−1)k
k!
(
e
1+bK−α(1+bM )
aK
)− (k+1)aKαaM
· Γ
[
(k + 1)aK
αaM
, 0, e
−α(β−bM )aK e
1+bK−α(1+bM )
aK
]
where Γ [s, 0, z] =
∫ z
0
τse−τdτ is the lower incomplete
Gamma function. Finally, since we are only interested in
the marginal distribution α, we set β → −∞ to obtain,
Pr(α ≤ α)
=
aK
αaM
∞∑
k=0
(−1)k
k!
e
−(k+1) 1+bK−α(1+bM )
αaM · Γ
[
(k + 1)aK
αaM
]
(6)
=
∞∑
k=0
(−1)k
(k + 1)!
e
−(k+1) 1+bK−α(1+bM )
αaM · Γ
[
1 +
(k + 1)aK
αaM
]
(7)
where the last step follows from the identity xΓ[x] =
Γ[x+ 1] for all x > 0. Thus, Theorem 1 follows.
B. Proof of Lemma 1
Denote E =
{
j : |〈hˆi∗ ,gj〉|2 > um
}
. Notice that 0 ≤
|E| ≤M .
When an eavesdropper sees above-threshold channel
projection, then the excess above the threshold follows
the exponential distribution with rate 1/aM [22, Ch. 4.2].
To ease notation, let γ i∗ = ‖hi∗‖2 and let γ j¯ ∈ E .
Accordingly, γ i∗ ∼ G(aK , bK) and γ j¯ ∼ Exp [1/aM ].
Let us define variables transformation α = 1+γi∗1+um+γ j¯ and
β = γ j¯ , for which the inverse is γ i∗ = α(1+um+γ j¯)−
1. Accordingly, we have
Pr (α > α,β > β)
= Pr
(
γ j¯ > β,γ i∗ > α
(
1 + um + γ j¯
)− 1)
=
∫ ∞
β
fγ j¯ (γj)
(
1− Fγi∗
(
α
(
1 + um + γ j¯
)− 1))dγj
=
(
1− Fγ j¯ (β)
)
−
∫ ∞
β
fγ j¯ (γj)Fγi∗ (α (1 + um + γj)− 1) dγj
Noting that fγ j¯ (γ) = e
−γ/aM /aM and Fγi∗ (γ) =
e−e
− γ−bK
aK , we exchange variables such that e−
αγj
aK = ζ,
hence, γj = −aKα log(ζ) and dγj = −aKαζ dζ. Further,
note that e−
γj
aM is equal to ζ
aK
αaM . Thus, we have,
Pr (α > α,β > β) =
(
1− Fγ j¯ (β)
)
−
∫ e− αβaK
0
aK
αaM
ζ
aK
αaM
−1 · e−e
1+bK−α(1+um)
aK ·ζdζ
=
(
1− Fγ j¯ (β)
)− aK
αaM
· e−
1+bK−α(1+um)
αaM Γ
[
aK
αaM
, 0, e
1+bK−α(1+um+β)
aK
]
To obtain the marginal distribution of the ratio α, we set
β = 0, to obtain
Pr (α > α)
= 1− aK
αaM
e
− 1+bK−α(1+um)αaM Γ
[
aK
αaM
, 0, e
1+bK−α(1+um)
aK
]
Note that a um can be calculated from the inverse
exponential distribution. Namely, um = 2 log(M). Note
also that for such a threshold the probability that exactly
one (strongest) eavesdropper is above-threshold is
Pr (|E| = 1) = (1− 1/M)M−1 → e−1 ≈ 0.37.
Further,
Pr (|E| > 1) = 1−
(
(1− 1/M)M−1 + (1− 1/M)M
)
→ 1− 2e−1 ≈ 0.26.
Thus, given that some eavesdroppers are above thresh-
old, it is most likely that only one has exceeded.
C. Proof of Lemma 2
Denote U = {i : ‖hi‖2 > uk}.
When a user sees above-threshold squared channel
norm, then the excess above the threshold, in this case
as well, follows the exponential distribution with rate
1/aK [22, Ch. 4.2]. To ease notation, let γ i¯ ∈ U and let
γ j∗ = |〈hˆi∗ ,gj∗〉|2. Accordingly, γ j∗ ∼ G(aM , bM ) and
γ i¯ ∼ Exp [1/aK ]. Let us define variables transformation
α = 1+uk+γ i¯1+γj∗ and β = γ j∗ , for which the inverse is
γ i¯ = α(1 + γ j∗)− (1 + uk). Accordingly, we have
Pr (α > α,β > β)
= Pr (γ i¯ > 0, (1 + uk + γ i¯) /α− 1 > γ j∗ > β)
=
∫ ∞
0
fγ i¯(γi)
(
Fγj∗
(
1 + uk + γ i¯
α
− 1
)
− Fγj∗ (β)
)
dγi
=
∫ ∞
0
fγ i¯(γi)Fγj∗
(
1 + uk + γ i¯
α
− 1
)
dγi − Fγj∗ (β)
Noting that fγ i¯(γ) = e
−γ/aK/aK and Fγj∗ (γ) =
e−e
− γ−bM
aM , we exchange variables such that e−
γi
αaM =
7
ζ, hence, γi = −αaM log(ζ) and dγi = −αaMζ dζ.
Further, note that e−
γi
aK is equal to ζ
αaM
aK . Thus, we
have,
Pr (α > α,β > β)
=
∫ 1
0
αaM
aK
ζ
aK
αaM
−1 · e−ζe
− 1+uk−α(1+bM )
αaM dζ − Fγj∗ (β)
=
αaM
aK
e
1+uk−α(1+bM )
aK Γ
[
αaM
aK
, 0, e
− 1+uk−α(1+bM )αaM
]
− Fγj∗ (β)
Setting β → −∞, the marginal distribution of α follows.
Note that a uk can be calculated from the inverse
regularized Gamma function. Note that uk can also be
approximated from bK . Herein, it is also most likely that
exactly one (strongest) user exceeded for such threshold.
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